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TRUST INVESTMENTS UNDER PENNSYLVANIA LAW
SIDNEY D. KLINE*
[Editorial Note: The following article is, in the words of the author, "a discussion of
existing laws of Pennsylvania as to investment powers of fiduciaries with emphasis upon their
present rigidity which results in unfairness to beneficiaries of trust estates, and suggested remedies
therefor." It does not purport to be an exhaustive legal analysis, but is rather a discussion of the
practical problems facing fiduciaries seeking to invest money under present conditions. Mr. Kline
seeks to stimulate thought and insight upon the practical questions involved by presenting realistically
the basic problem and the purpose for which the trust was set up.]

On November 7, 1933, a new tra began in the law of permitted legal investments for fiduciaries. At the municipal election held November 7, 1933, a joint
resolution of the Senate and the House of Representatives proposing to amend
Article Thrce, Section Twenty-two of the Constitution of Pennsylvania, to read as
follows:
"Section Twenty-two. The General Assembly may, from time to
time, by law, prescribe the nature and kind of investments for trust
funds to be made by executors, administrators, trustees, guardians and
other fiduciaries"
was approved by a majority of votes cast on said proposed amendment.
The General Assembly was not long in making use of this new power. On
May 28, 1937,1 an amendment was made to the Fiduciaries Act of 1917, Section
41 (a) 1, as amended in subsequent years up tot and including the Act of 1935,2
This 1937 Act relating to fiduciary investments was both a codification of preceding
laws and a broadening of the field of permitted investments for fiduciaries.
Briefly, under the amendment, trustees were authorized to purchase, with immunity
(as described in the Act) against any liability for subsequent loss however occasioned, the following permitted legal investments:
United States obligations, direct or guaranteed,
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania obligations, direct or guaranteed,
Local Pennsylvania municipal obligations,
First mortgages on improved real estate located within Pennsylvania
not exceeding two-thirds of the fair value thereof,
Bonds, Mortgage Pools, Mortgage fractional interests secured by first
mortgages having the same characteristics as individual mortgages,
*A.B. Dickinson College, 1924, M.A. 1926, LL.B. Dickinson School of Law, 1926; admitted
to practice law in Berks and Philadelphia Counties and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1926;
Vice President and Trust Officer, Berks County Trust Company, Reading, Pennsylvania, since 1933.
1P. L. 1037, 20 PuaD. STATS. (Pa.) §801.
2P. L. 545, 20 PURD. STArs. (Pa.) §801.
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Ground rents,
Certain obligations of railroads, gas, water, electric, and telephone companies selected by a complicated formula on a very conservative
basis,
First mortgages insured by the Federal Housing Administration up to
ninety percent of the fair value of real estate securing said mortgages, regardless of the location of the real estate, within or without the Commonwealth of. Pennsylvania,
Federal Land Bank bonds,
Deposits of $500 (now $1,000 by amendment passed in 1939) in
savings accounts of an institution which is not the trustee of the
fund being invested,
Consolidated Federal Intermediate Credit Bank Debentures,
Shares of building and loan associations insured by the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation,
Obligations of General State Authority and Housing Authorities,
Home Owners Loan Corporation bonds.
The Fiduciaries Act, Section 41 (a) paragraph 3 then provides:
"In case the said moneys shall be invested as set forth in paragraph
one of clause (a) of this section, or conformably to the directions of
the court, under paragraph two of clause (a) of this section, the said
fiduciary shall be exempted from all liability for loss on the same, in
like manner as if such investments had been made in pursuance of
directions in the will creating the trust, it being hereby declared that
the investments mentioned in this section are legal investments of
moneys by fiduciaries: Provided, however, That if any such investment shall cease to be a legal investment, it shall be the duty of such
fiduciary to exercise due care and prudence in the ascertainment of such
fact, and in the disposition or retention of any such investment thereafter."
This paragraph gives the fiduciary its reward for following the dictates of the
General Assembly. If the wisdom of the General Assembly is followed, the
trustee will not have to pay for any loss, if a loss occurs, provided, however, the
trustee is able to show due care and skill in selecting investments within the limits
of the legal list. Practical experience reveals that it is easier to prove the use of
proper care, caution, and skill in making legal investments than in selecting securities not so enumerated.
It is important to remember that the General Assembly has not seen fit to
rely entirely upon the due care and prudence of the fiduciary in the making of an
original investment. Instead, it prescribed the list indicated heretofore, but in
Section 41 cause (a), paragraph 3, and also in Section 41 clause (a) paragraph
1, sub-section 19, paragraphs (a) and (c) of the Fiduciaries Act, it provides that
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the fiduciary shall use due care and diligence in holding or disposing of an investment after it becomes illegal, or if an illegal investment was received in kind. It
seems inconsistent to vest this partial discretion in the fiduciary after a situation
has become prospective of a loss, and not to give the free choice of investments
to the fiduciary in the first place.
In 1937 after the passage of the Act under discussion, certain underlying
issues of a( least fourteen railroads were designated as legal for trust investments,
including the following:
Western Maryland,
Virginian,
Atchison, T. & S. F.,
Chesapeake & Ohio,
Louisville & Nashville,
Pennsylvania,
Reading Co.,
Union Pacific.
Today statisticians say that only certain issues of four railroads are legal because of
the sharp decline in earnings of railroads during the calendar year of 1938. If
the trustee, after due investigation and exercise of caution, determines to hold
certain first lien bonds of the Pennsylvania Railroad (they are no longer legal)
in accordance with the terms of the Act, the fiduciary would not be surcharged
with the subsequent decline in price of such bonds. But, if the fiduciary should
today purchase such a bond as an original investment, and it should decline in
price, the trustee could be held liable for the loss. It is difficult to find a distinguishing reason for such diverse conclusions.
The present state of law as to legal investments is superior to the conditions
existing during the "nineteen twenties" as to broadness of class but not as to yield
to the life tenants. Basically, investments made from the legal list of the
"twenties" yielded a fair return to the beneficiary. If selected with care and

prudence such investments did not involve too great a risk of loss of principal.
From this conclusion there must be one exception. The narrow list of available
legal investments caused the Pennsylvania fiduciary, more and more, to buy a

larger proportion of mortgages, either entirely for trusts, or by way of participations in mortgages, or participations in mortgage pools, for various trust accounts.

This resulted in an unsound concentration in mortgage investments.

The mort-

gages in the main were honestly placed, based on an appraisal in line with actual
construction costs and sales consummated during said period. There were isolated
cases of mortgages being placed with more care in fitting the record to the re-

quirements of the statute (as to the two-thirds limit against an appraisal of fair
market value) than regard to merit. These isolated cases received broad publicity, but percentage-wise these cases were negligible compared to the total amount
invested by fiduciaries during the period.
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When the precipitous decline of real estate values occurred, mortgage investments of trust estates became frozen and unliquid; losses were incurred; beneficiarics suffcred. Perhaps there would have been a more satisfactory record if
fiduciaries had had a broader base for trust investments. Undoubtedly, there
would have been lss litigation for the purpose of securing surcharges on mortgage investments during the past eight or nine years. To repeat, it is the opinion
of many having practical experience in the problem of investing trust funds, that
the abuses in the mortgage field of trust investments were caused in part by the
pressure of funds seeking investment with no substantial class of investments
available excepting mortgages.
The legal list today is broadened. The supply of money seeking investment
today is rising faster than the available investments appear. Interest rates are
going down. Yield for life tenants becomes less and less. In addition, for purposes of unemployment relief, a tax of eight mills per annum, per dollar of investment of money at interest is levied jointly by the counties of Pennsylvania and the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, regardless of the yield of such investment. A
mortgage yiclding six percent interest and a mortgage yielding four percent interest
are taxed at the same rate on the principal amount. Investors and insurance companies, non-resident of Pennsylvania, need not pay these taxes. Consequently,
they are buying the better mortgages throughout Pennsylvania, taking them away
from the Pennsylvania fiduciary on the competition of a lower interest rate (which
to them is ftee of the eight mills tax). Thus the field of permitted legal investments becomes still narrower. Just recently a new issue of United States Treasury
bonds, maturing in eleven years and bearing a two percent coupon, was oversubscribed by a very large margin, and the bonds subsequently sold above par.
Under present conditions, Pennsylvania law tends to drive money seeking
investment out of Pennsylvania, and deprives Pennsylvania fiduciaries of business
which should stay at home. If a trust is created locally, the life tenant is deprived
of a return comparable with that which can be earned by fiduciaries in other states
under more favorable legislation.
Present laws permit the purchase of Federal Housing Administration mortgages and bonds of railroads and public utilities where the basic security is located
in other states, but at the same time prohibit the purchase of direct obligations of
other states and municipalities of other states. Does the General Assembly wish
to say that the municipal obligation of the City of Camden, New Jersey, is an
inferior investment to the bond of some utility company operating in the State
of New Jersey? No reasonable basis for such differentiation seems evident.
In 1939 the General Assembly further attempted to broaden the scope of
legal trust investments by elaborating on the method of investing trust funds
through the media of fractional interests in mortgages,3 and by enacting legislation

8Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 721, 20 PURD. STATS. (Pa.)

§801.
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approving the plan known as the Common Trust Funds Act.4 Neither of these
Acts gives any true measure of relief to the problem heretofore discussed because
they are both limited to the field of legal investment, which was not enlarged
as a result of the passage of the Acts.
The discussion up to this point has dwclt upon the inflexible limitations of
legal investments. Necessarily these limitations are felt only in trusts created by
a court order, or those in which the creator, either by will or by other instrument,
did not give discretion to the fiduciary to invest estate funds in securities other than
legal investments. The skilled investor, or the individual skillfully advised by his
attorney, who has come to realize the limitations of the permitted list of fiduciary investments, has remedied the situation heretofore pictured by giving his fiduciary
powers of investment which are substantially broader than those granted by the
General Assembly. With that class of trusts this article is not concerned. The fact
that in the investment programs of the estates of most skilled investors, or those advised by skilled attorneys, there has been a definite departure from the limitations
of Pe.nsylvania legal investment law is evidence of the failure of the Pennsylvania
law to meet the current demands for the investment of idle money. The defects
described are concerned with the average small trust account where heretofore the
broad power of investment was not granted to the trustee, and also the many
trust accounts which will arise in the future with no provision for a broader field
of investments than that prescribed by the General Assembly. Unless some
measure of relief is granted, beneficiaries of these small estates may have to be
satisfied with a much smaller return on their security funds. It seems, therefore,
that it is timc for Pennsylvania to come of age in its investment policies so far as
trust estates are concerned.
It is not well to give the impression that the latitude desired is one of wild
speculation, because truly it is not the function of a trustee to attempt to appreciate
the principa! of the trust, but it is to earn a fair return for the life tenant and
preserve the principal for the remainderman. The suggested remedies which
follow have that purpose and no other.
It is sometimes supposed that courts and judges in interpreting statutory law
tend toward the conservative point of view, and to a degree act in check upon the
liberal tendcncies of legislatures. Recently there have been some dicta in opinions
which seem to indicate that the judges are abandoning this conservative point
of view toward an investment policy. The Pennsylvania Superior Court said in
Wood's Estate:5
"There is much less objection to
was a century ago. This is shown
servative, and experienced financier
pointed by him to invest in stocks,

investment in stocks than there
by the fact that the shrewd, confrequently authorizes trustees aprealizing that circumstances arise

4Act of June 24, 1939, P. L. 726, 7 PURD. STATS, (Pa.) § 819-1109.

5130 Pa. Super. 397, 197 A. 638 (1938).
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where they may be safer than bonds, although this is not the general
rule. In periods of threatened inflation arising from a depreciated
currency, common stocks may be a safer investment than bonds."
The Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County in a majority opinion reached
the conclusion that it was empowered to issue a declaration that the trustees were
authorized to invest in shares of stock after the trustees sought the guidance of
the court. The Supreme Court, in Carvithen'sEstate,6 reversed the decision and
repudiated the effort of the Orphans' Court of Philadelphia County to assist the
trustees in determining their investment policy. The reversal was based on the
lack of an existing controversy, and not on a disagreement with the tenor of the
lower court's decision. More and more, there seems to be a tendency on the
part of courts to indicate that not all wisdom in investing is concentrated in the
so-called legal list. Decisions point toward the recognition that there are many
securities outside the legal list which in many respects have qualities equal, or
superior, to those contained within the legal list.
The judges in this attitude are merely following the considered conclusion
of various 'economists who for some time have been advocating a broader base for
trust investment. Dr. F. Cyril James, formerly of the University of Pennsylvania, now of McGill University, in a recent address has said, in part:
"Investments in stocks and in real estate-the only possible hedges
against long-run inflation-must become as important as, if not more
important than, investments in bonds and mortgages.
"On the legal side, it is apparent that the regulations imposed on
trustees by courts and legislatures must be liberalized along lines that
will allow greater freedom of action in the selection of desirable investments, while trustors must be encouraged to refrain from rigid
instructions in wills and other deeds of trust.
"If a particular trustee is considered capable of assuming the management of an estate he is entitled to expect that he will be allowed
to use all his ability and intelligence in administering the trust."
What then can be done to give fiduciaries in Pennsylvania broader investment
powers? As a minimum concession, the General Assembly can give the trustee as
much authority in the investing of trust assets as it has given to life insurance
companies for investing the reserves which secure the payment of life insurance
policies. This gives them the authority to buy all of the investments which have
been listed heretofore, and in addition thereto, state and municipal bonds of other
states than Pennsylvania and mortgages on real estate located in any state of the
United States. Besides these two material enlargements, the General Assembly 7
has given this broad discretion:
6327 Pa. 490, 194 Atd. 743 (1937).
7Act of May 17, 1921, P. L. .682, §404 (h), 40 PURI. STATS. (Pa.) §504.
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"First encumbrances upon standard steam railroads, street and interurban railways, or upon their rolling stock equipment, or of water,
gas or other public utility companies, or bonds issued to retire a prior
debt, or bonds prior thereto or any other bonds or notes of the abovenamed corporations, upon which no default in interest exists at the
time of purchase."
Life insurance companies for the past thirty-five years have had an excellent
record in earning fine returns on their invested reserves, and in discharging their
obligations under their contracts. This record is due in part to the excellent way
in which their carefully selected personnel has handled the investment problems
of the insurance companies. If this personnel had been hampered with a narrow
list of investments such as legislation has wound around the Pennsylvania fiduciary,
the results undoubtedly would have been less successful. The principle of a
very broad base of investment so as to give a maximum spread of risk of principal
is entirely sound, as proved by the experience of the life insurance companies.
This initial step would prove most helpful to the Pennsylvania fiduciary.
A further step would be to enlarge upon the common trust fund idea which
met the approval of the House of Representatives and the Senate in 1939, but
which did not aid in solving the problem in Pennsylvania because the idea was
limited to legal investments. This would permit the formation of a mutual nonprofit corporation to invest in the same securities as life insurance companies are
permitted to buy for use of their capital and reserves, and. to sell investment contracts secured by such investments to various corporate fiduciaries throughout Pennsylvania so as to obtain the advantage of the broad diversification which such policy
gives. Such corporation would be exposed to the income tax of the Federal government, but since the obligation to pay interest on the investment contracts would act
as a deduction, the burden of income tax would not be great enough under present
laws to offset the advantage obtained from a broad spread of risk of principal and
increased income. In addition to these advantages there would be the greater
flexibil;ty of investment program in buying and selling which cannot be obtained
in small units.
This suggestion is not purely theoretical. A corporation has been organized
in the State of Massachusetts called "Trust Funds, Inc." It attempts to do for
fiduciaries in Boston on a profit basis what is contemplated for Pennsylvania
fiduciaries on a mutual basis. The projected company could be organized for
Pennsylvania fiduciaries, manned by a Board of Directors selected from the personnel of Pennsylvania banks. The investment and statistical force would necessarily be of the best. No officer or employee would be permitted to have any
relation to, or connection with, any other financial, or stock or bond distributing
house, so that their conclusions would be free of any outside influence.
The third suggestion for Pennsylvania is the most drastic but is more in line
with present trends in the New England states and apparently with the thinking
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of our judgcs and economists who have studied the problem. A study of surcharges and attempted surcharges through the judicial process undoubtedly will
reveal that the successful investment of trust funds was not obtained because of
iron-clad restrictions and rules, but in spite of such rules. Successful trusteeship
in the past was the result of sound management exercising due care, prudence, and
diligence. Losses were incurred within the so-called legal limits of trust investments as they existed in the "twenties." The form of the investment in many
cases gave protection to the trustee against liability for the losses incurred. Particularly was this true in the case of mortgages placed in accordance with statutory
law after due caution was taken to have the real estate securing the same properly
appraised, and to limit the amount of the mortgage to two-thirds, or less, of the
appraisal. United States Liberty Bonds were bought at par during the World
War and sold at eighty-four cents on the dollar several years later, and the trustees
were not held liable for the loss. It would seem better to give the trustee greater
freedom and less regulatory statutes. Massachusetts for years has regulated its
fiduciaries with a very simple rule which provides that"trust funds may be invested in bonds, or stocks, or other securities
selected by the trustee, with the care of a prudent investor."
Connecticut in 1939 passed a similar statute adopting the Massachusetts rule.
Pennsylvania would do well to adopt a similar statute.
We in Pennsylvania have been accustomed to an accepted legal list accompanied by an immunity clause which provides that if a trustee buys such investments
after using due care and prudence it shall not be held liable for loss. Most persons involved in investing trust funds reached the conclusion that the converse
was law, namely, if a trustee with due care and prudence buys a security which is
not a legal investment but which statistically is sound, and a loss is incurred, the
trustee is a guarantor of the fund and must pay the loss. An incomplete study of
the cases does not reveal a statement of facts where this situation actually occurred
with a resultant surcharge to the trustee. It would be interesting to have such a
case arise and to ascertain whether the courts would follow it to such logical conclusion. It may be possible that underlying the legal list which gives immunity as described heretofore, the Pennsylvania court would, or could, still create the equivalent of the Massachusetts rule by decreeing upon due proof of proper care and
prudence in the purchase of what statistically is a sound investment, that the trustee
will not hc held liable for loss. In any event if the courts cannot create such
interpretation by judicial process, it would be helpful in the administration of trusts
for the benefit of the life tenant and remainderman to have the enactment of such
a rule by the General Assembly.
READING, PA.
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